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From Handbills to Proposed Bills: Suggestions for
Regulating the Las Vegas “Strip” Tease
I. INTRODUCTION
The world-class resorts that shape Las Vegas’ neon skyline draw
millions of visitors each year. These tourists are the lifeblood of the
local economy, and they come to enjoy the attractions and
accommodations densely concentrated along Las Vegas Boulevard.
This resort district, known as the Strip, offers visiting pedestrians
stunning architectural views, inexpensive meals, live sidewalk shows,
and access to numerous hotel-casinos. However, while these
attractions have been proven to effectively generate profits for resort
owners, another force now aggressively competes for the time and
attention of would-be resort patrons.
Visitors walking along the Strip are constantly bombarded with
adult-themed handbills distributed by off-premises canvassers.1 The
majority of this material depicts graphic advertisements for referral
services that provide erotic dancers directly to visitors’ hotel rooms.2
Because of its dense concentration of relatively new resorts, the
Strip is often inundated with pedestrians using inadequately sized
sidewalks to travel between attractions.3 This congestion has created

1. See Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d
1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15912); see also Order (Case Nos. CV-S-97-0123-LDG(RJJ),
CV-S-97-0146-LDG(RJJ)) at 3, 6 (D. Nev. March 4, 1997); CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE
OF ORDINANCES 16.12.020(5) (1997) (defining “off-premises canvassing” as distributing
handbills on public sidewalks).
2. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 7–8; Joe Schoenmann, County
Takes Aim, Again, at Strip Handbillers, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 6, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/may/06/plan-g-no-news-racks-allowed; Dave Toplikar,
Mayor Opposed Escort Service Handbillers on Fremont Street, LAS VEGAS SUN (Jan. 20, 2011,
2:30 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jan/20/mayor-opposed-escort-servicesolicitors-fremont-st.
3. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.010 (1997) (“Since,
traditionally, the major emphasis along the Strip has been on automobile transportation and
not on pedestrians, the existing pedestrian environment is inadequate as a transportation
system and lacking in many safety features. Moreover, a great number of persons are engaged
in use of the public sidewalks to conduct off-premises canvassing which creates undue
obstruction, hindrance, blockage, hampering, and interference with pedestrian travel and
littering of the public sidewalks . . . . The activities of these congregating canvassers coupled
with competition frequently result in the harassment of pedestrians. Large numbers of
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what county commissioners have termed a “captive audience” for
opportunistic adult outcall businesses, which use canvassers to
obstruct high-traffic areas, effectively forcing their handbills on
visitors.4 To make matters worse, the frequency of pedestrian delay
has increased significantly during recent years as a result of fierce
competition between outcall services. Because each service aims to
outsell its competitors, each has the incentive to have the largest
canvassing presence in the most congested locations.5 This
“competitive cycle” has resulted in a glut of handbillers lining both
sides of the Strip’s bottlenecked sidewalks, creating gauntlets of
graphic advertising “through which pedestrians must pass and in
which the pedestrians are forced to take the proffered advertising.”6
Occasionally, pedestrians wishing to avoid the graphic material are
forced into the dangerous street as they attempt to bypass the
cordons of canvassers.7
This competitive and congested atmosphere has resulted in
tourist harassment, physical disputes among canvassers, and extreme
amounts of sexually charged litter.8 These conditions directly affect
resort patronage, particularly at the resorts abutting premium
canvassing locations.9 As a result, between 1994 and 1996,
numerous resorts and other businesses brought civil actions to enjoin
canvassers from engaging in such obstructive and abusive practices.

pedestrians are walking in the streets to avoid harassment and the congested public sidewalks
and many pedestrians are crossing against the traffic signal indications.”).
4. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 7–9.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 9. In many locations, these gauntlets include as many as twenty or more
canvassers strategically positioned in confined areas of narrow sidewalks. Id.
7. Id. at 18–19, n.17 (One canvassing representative “admitted during cross
examination that he and his competitors would specifically target sidewalk areas with heavy
pedestrian volume . . . for distribution of their commercial advertisements, that commercial
canvassers would stand ‘shoulder to shoulder,’ all ‘to slam a tourist with a book,’ that he
himself observed a lot of fights among the canvassers on the sidewalks, that the canvassers
would threaten and harrass [sic] tourists and call them names, that they would engage in
violent confrontations over the prime ‘hot spots’ on the resort district’s sidewalks, and that
pedestrians would be forced off the sidewalks and into the streets as a result of these
activities.”); see CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.010 (1997);
Schoenmann, supra note 2.
8. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 10–11.
9. See Liz Benston, Peddlers, Performers Clogging the Strip are Troubling to Casinos,
LAS VEGAS SUN (July 27, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jul/27
/human-clutter-strip-troubling-resorts/.
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This led to the issuance of over twenty court orders concerning
pedestrian abuse.10
Recognizing the need to regulate aggressive canvassing tactics,
Clark County has repeatedly attempted to enact a legislative
solution. In 1994, county commissioners enacted the Obstructive
Use Ordinance in an effort to alleviate sidewalk congestion by
criminalizing pedestrian obstruction.11 Unlike later restrictions, this
ordinance did not implicate canvassers’ expressive rights, but instead
prohibited them from “stacking and storing their distribution
materials on sidewalks.”12 However, as is evident from the litany of
injunctions issued after its passage,13 the Obstructive Use Ordinance
failed to prevent pedestrian obstruction.
In 1996, the county made a second legislative attempt to resolve
its persistent concerns for pedestrian safety. It patterned the new
ordinance after a law previously enacted in Key West, Florida, a
tourist community with similar canvassing problems. On its face, the
Key West ordinance completely banned all off-premises canvassing in
the city’s tourist district,14 and, like the Clark County ordinance, it
was enacted only after less restrictive efforts had failed. The Key West
model was attractive to Clark County’s commissioners because it was
both demonstrably effective and had survived a First Amendment
challenge at the Eleventh Circuit.15
Clark County’s version of the ordinance, known as Section
16.12, took effect on January 1, 1997, and made it a misdemeanor
to engage in “off-premises canvassing” within the Las Vegas Resort
District.16 Like the Key West ordinance, Section 16.12 specifically
defined “off-premises canvassing” as “distributing, handing out, or
offering, on public sidewalks, handbills, leaflets . . . or other printed
or written literature . . . which . . . propose one or more commercial
transactions.”17

10. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 11.
11. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.11.010 (1997).
12. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 12 (citing CLARK COUNTY,
NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.11.070 (1997)).
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 13–14 (citing Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996)).
16. CLARK COUNTY, NEV CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.040(a), (d) (1997).
17. CLARK COUNTY, NEV CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.020 (5) (1997).

1295

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

On January 31, 1997, the operators of two Nevada-based outcall
services filed suit in a U.S. district court challenging the
constitutionality of the ordinance as it applied to their businesses.
Shortly thereafter, the ACLU intervened as a plaintiff, contending
that the ordinance facially violated the First Amendment, because it
regulated both commercial speech and “fully protected
noncommercial speech that is inextricably intertwined with
commercial speech.”18 The district court disagreed and subsequently
denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.19
The following year the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
ACLU had demonstrated the probable success of its claim.20
Consequently, the matter was remanded, and the county was
enjoined from enforcing the ordinance.21 Nine years later, the district
court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad.22
To date, the county has failed to enact a comprehensive solution
to the canvassing problem, which some believe is threatening
Nevada’s “economic engine” by “tarnishing the Strip’s image as a
safe and fun place for tourists.”23 While resort executives “have long
expressed concerns to county commissioners about various
nuisances—handbillers of sexual entertainment in particular”24—the
county has neither enacted nor enforced an ordinance directly
regulating obstructive canvassing since the Ninth Circuit’s injunction
in 1997.25 This lack of legislative progress, however, should be
18. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by
160 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 1998).
19. Id. at 1141.
20. County of Clark, 160 F.3d at 542.
21. Id.
22. See S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1134 (D. Nev. 2007).
23. See Benston, supra note 9; see also Scott Wyland, Some Seek Crackdown Against
Street Peddlers Strip, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2011, 1:59 AM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/some-seek-crackdown-against-street-peddlers-on-strip126503523.html.
24. Benston, supra note 9.
25. It is worth noting, however, that on Tuesday, August 7th, 2012—months after this
Comment was accepted for publication—Clark County Commissioners approved an antilittering ordinance that will require handbillers to pick up and dispose of handbills discarded by
passersby every fifteen minutes, in the area within twenty-five feet of where the material was
distributed. See Kristi Jourdan, Commissioners Pass Law Targeting Litterers on the Strip, LAS
VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL
(Aug.
7,
2012,
5:52
PM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/commissioners-pass-law-targeting-litterers-on-the-strip165363006.html. While this new law is likely to improve the overall image of the Strip by
removing much of the sexually charged litter from sidewalks and storm drains, it is not a
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understood not as tacit approval of aggressive canvassing, but
instead, as the result of the county’s hesitancy to expose itself to
another round of First Amendment litigation.26
Surely there is truth to the argument that obstructive canvassing
is harmful to the state’s economy. Although the documented
rationale for enacting Section 16.12 was largely pedestrian safety, it
would be naive to contend that county officials were not concerned
about resort profitability. Indeed, the Strip constitutes a major
source of the state’s revenue and employs a substantial number of
Las Vegans. Thus, during this time of economic instability and the
resulting decline in tourism, it is no surprise that county officials
have been clear about their desire to restore the Strip’s once
appealing image.27
However, despite the county’s interest in attracting tourists, it
must also consider the high costs associated with attempts to
regulate speech. For example, when Clark County enacted and
defended Section 16.12, it not only failed to resolve its concerns, but
also became embroiled in a costly ten-year legal battle, which
resulted in an award of attorney’s fees and almost a quarter–million

compressive solution to the county’s obstructive canvassing concerns. On its face, it does
nothing to limit where, when, or how canvassers may approach or obstruct pedestrians.
Instead, it simply imposes a new burden on canvassers. To be sure, this added inconvenience is
likely to adversely affect canvassing profits, but there is little reason to believe that it will result
in a noticeable reduction in obstructive practices. This, presumably, is why county
commissioners are once again reviewing proposals for an ordinance that would regulate
obstructive canvassing as a safety concern. See Jane Ann Morrison, County Targets Strip Pests
One Animal, Panhandler at a Time, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Jul. 2, 2012, 2:00 AM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/county-targets-strip-pests-one-animal-panhand
ler-at-a-time161047405.html (noting that one interest group alone has developed thirty-two such
proposals, and that the county recently commissioned a $581,000 study of congestion on the
Strip, which it intends to use when drafting a final ordinance); see also Kristi Jourdan, County
Orders Study of Strip Pedestrian Congestion, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2012, 7:20
AM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/county-orders-581-000-study-of-strip-pedestriancongestion-146006445.html (explaining that in April 2012, “commissioners approved [the]
$581,000, three-month study to identify areas where pedestrian movement is congested on
[the Strip],” and that it will be used to inform proposed code amendments aimed at
“regulating commercial activity on sidewalks”). Thus, despite the county’s new anti-littering
law, a discussion about a defensible ordinance directly regulating obstructive canvassing is as
relevant now as it has ever been.
26. See Morrison, supra note 25 (suggesting that county commissioners have been slow
to enact proposed solutions to the obstructive canvassing problem because of the strength of
canvassers’ First Amendment concerns); see also Benston, supra note 9.
27. Schoenmann, supra note 2.
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dollars in damages.28 Certainly, the prospect of facing another similar
defeat has, to some degree, chilled efforts to enact a regulation
reflective of the commission’s actual position on canvassing.29 Thus,
county commissioners are stuck in the proverbial “damned if you do,
damned if you don’t” position: on one hand, they cannot afford to
allow aggressive canvassers to perpetuate a further decline in tourism,
and on the other, they must consider the high costs that will likely
follow another judicially rejected attempt at effective regulation.
This Comment addresses these competing concerns by
evaluating three possible regulatory models in terms of both utility
and defensibility. It proceeds by (1) demonstrating that the
privatization of canvassing regulation is likely to be found
indefensible if challenged in either state or federal court; (2)
exploring the inescapable problem with regulating canvassing
through the commercial-speech doctrine; and (3) proposing the
adoption of a narrowed version of the content-neutral, time, place,
and manner restriction upheld by the Supreme Court in Hill v.
Colorado.30
II. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE PROPERTY: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A
DIFFERENCE
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Section 16.12, Clark
County has essentially attempted to privatize canvassing regulation
by supporting the exclusionary efforts of private-property owners.31
On the surface, this appears to be an attractive solution for two
reasons: first, it allows the owners of “mega-resorts,” who often own
the sidewalks immediately abutting their properties, to
independently restrict a substantial amount of undesired canvassing.
Second, it leaves the county itself unexposed to the risks of First
Amendment litigation. Of course, the immediate drawback to this
approach is that canvassers excluded from private property will
presumably relocate to already congested publicly owned sidewalks.
28. Joe Schoenmann, The Likely Price of Lost Battle over Handbillers, LAS VEGAS SUN
(Nov. 16, 2008, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/nov/16/likely-pricelost-battle-over-handbillers; S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, No. 2:97-CV-0123 LDG(RJJ),
2008 WL 700293 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2008).
29. See Morrison, supra note 25; see also Schoenmann, supra note 2.
30. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
31. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants at 5–6, S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23
P.3d 243 (Nev. 2001) (No. 34563).
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The county, though, seems willing to bear this cost because doing so
allows at least some resort owners to preserve a visitor friendly
atmosphere.32 Moreover, under existing Nevada case law, it is
tempting to conclude that this partial solution is legally sustainable.
Indeed, in 2001, when canvassers challenged Mirage Resorts’s right
to exclude, the Nevada Supreme Court announced in a plurality
opinion that privately owned sidewalks immediately abutting resortowned properties were not subject to full First Amendment
protections.33 However, a thorough examination of the Mirage
decision reveals that its precedential value is questionable at best.
This is further evidenced by a Ninth Circuit decision handed down
less than two months later, in which the court held that a nearly
identical portion of privately held sidewalk, located just across the
street, was a public forum subject to full First Amendment
protection.34 Ultimately, these cases suggest that canvassers are likely
to prevail in future challenges to resort owners’ exclusionary efforts,
and consequently, that it is only a matter of time until the county
will need to consider a new regulatory model.
A. The Mirage Decision: An Illusory Support for the Resort Owner’s
Right to Exclude
The portion of sidewalk at issue in Mirage was privately owned
by Mirage Resorts (the Mirage) and immediately abutted the rest of
the resort property.35 Consistent with the theme of its Treasure
Island hotel, a section of the sidewalk is built from wooden planks
slightly elevated several feet above the ground. Signs indicating that
the property is privately held by the Mirage are located at various
points along the passageway.36 In 1993, in order to comply with
local zoning and licensing requirements, the Mirage conveyed to
Clark County “a perpetual pedestrian easement over, under, and
across the parcel of land” on which the sidewalk at issue was
located.37 The legal description of the easement states that it is a

32. See generally id.
33. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 248.
34. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d
937, 948 (9th Cir. 2001).
35. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 245.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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“pedestrian easement for the west right-of-way of Las Vegas
Boulevard.”38 The county required the easement, because
constructing the Treasure Island required the elimination of publicly
owned sidewalks.39
In 1999, the Mirage filed suit seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions
against
two
outcall
services
(known
as
S.O.C./Hillsboro), claiming that the corporations were trespassing
by directing canvassers to distribute handbills on the Treasure Island
walkway.40 A Nevada trial court granted the preliminary injunction
and S.O.C./Hillsboro appealed.41 The Nevada Supreme Court
eventually upheld the Mirage’s right to exclude the canvassers, but it
left the public forum question largely unsettled. Writing for the
plurality, Justice Young focused on two principal issues: (1) whether
the easement contemplated the type of canvassing at issue; and (2) if
it did not, whether the walkway actually constituted a public forum,
warranting full First Amendment protection.42 He began with an
analysis of the easement itself, concluding that a narrow reading of
its express language limited its scope to pedestrian travel.43 As a
consequence, he noted, the easement “does not contemplate use by
commercial businesses seeking to advance their own economic
gains,”44 and therefore, any such commercial activity constitutes an
actionable trespass.45
He next addressed S.O.C./Hillsboro’s alternative claim that, as a
public forum, the Treasure Island sidewalk is subject to full First
Amendment protection. He began with a brief history of public
forum jurisprudence, noting that “[t]he United States Supreme
Court has formulated an approach to the protection of free speech
based largely on the type of forum involved.”46 In the Perry decision,
the Supreme Court identified three types of forums: (1) the
“quintessential public forum,” which “encompasses ‘places which by
long tradition or government fiat have been devoted to assembly and

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Id.
Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 246, 248.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
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debate,’ such as streets and parks”; (2) the semipublic forum, which
includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity”; and (3) the “‘nonpublic
forum,’ which consists of property that is neither by tradition nor
designation a forum for public discourse.”47
Using this framework, Justice Young opined that
S.O.C./Hillsboro had blithely attempted to characterize the
Treasure Island sidewalk as a public forum. He explained that the
mere opening of walkway for pedestrian travel is not in itself
indicative of a public forum, and that any rule to the contrary would
“paint[ ] too broad a stroke” over the property owner’s fundamental
right to exclude.48 While he did not expressly call for further proof
that the walkway either traditionally attracted public discourse or was
intended to invite expressive activity, he went on to cite numerous
cases rejecting similar claims for lack of such evidence.49
However, Justice Young’s public forum analysis was rejected by
three of the five members of the court. While concurring in the
result, Chief Justice Maupin wrote separately, contending that the
walkway was a public forum. He began by noting that the public
forum issue was conclusively settled by the federal district court in
Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board.50 In Venetian,
a resort owner excluded union members from picketing on a private
pedestrian walkway in front of the Venetian Casino Resort. In that
case, however, a federal district court judge concluded that the
sidewalk was a public forum, reasoning that it “was previously public,
serves as a thoroughfare along a main public road, and serves the
needs of the general public.”51
Although Justice Maupin concluded that the federal district
court’s public forum rule must also apply to the practically identical
Treasure Island walkway, he contended that the Mirage’s exclusion
of the commercial canvassers was nevertheless permissible.52 He

47. Id. at 248–49 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
48. Id. at 249.
49. Id. at 249–50 n.40.
50. Id. at 252. At the time of the Mirage decision, the Venetian case was pending before
the Ninth Circuit. The effects of the Ninth Circuit’s decision are discussed below.
51. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1036 (D.
Nev. 1999).
52. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 252 (Maupin, J., concurring).

1301

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

explained that unlike the political speech at issue in Venetian, the
speech at issue in Mirage was commercial in nature and, therefore,
not subject to full First Amendment protection.53 Quoting from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Metromedia, he asserted that even in
the traditional public forum, “the difference between commercial
price and product advertising and ideological communication
permits regulation of the former that the First Amendment would
not tolerate with respect to the latter.”54 He then concluded that the
suppression of S.O.C./Hillsboro’s expression was permissible under
the test announced by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson,55
because it appeared to either “solicit offers of illegal prostitution” or
create a misleading impression of the same.56
Justice Rose, the lone dissenter, agreed that the walkway
constituted a public forum, but he did not reach the commercial
speech issue. Instead, he contended that uncontroverted evidence
demonstrated that the offers for erotic dance services were merely a
pretext for offers of illegal prostitution.57 Accordingly, he noted that
had the lower court determined that the advertisements in fact
promoted illegal activity, he would have joined the Chief Justice in
upholding the Mirage’s right to exclude despite the existence of a
public forum.58
Therefore, although Justice Young’s plurality opinion suggests
that resort-owned walkways are not necessarily public forums, it is
unclear what, if any, precedential weight Mirage carries. In fact, a
majority of the Mirage justices actually argued that the Treasure
Island sidewalk was a public forum. This alone indicates the
possibility that Mirage could prove unfavorable for resort owners in
future public forum litigation at the Nevada Supreme Court.

53. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980)).
54. Id. (quoting Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
55. Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 255 (Rose, J., dissenting). At the district court the Mirage presented a
substantial amount of evidence tending to show that the offers for erotic dance are a mere
pretext for prostitution. For example, a detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department’s vice squad testified that acts of prostitution are offered during ninety-five
percent of sting operations. Respondents’ Answering Brief at 15, Mirage, 23 P.3d 243 (No.
34563).
58. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 255.
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Furthermore, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Venetian, it
is almost certain that the Strip’s sidewalk canvassers will eventually
win on a public forum claim brought in either state or federal court.
B. The Venetian Appeal
On appeal from the district court’s Venetian decision, the Ninth
Circuit held that a section of sidewalk privately held by the Venetian
Casino Resort was a public forum for the purposes of First
Amendment protection. The Venetian sidewalk, like its Treasure
Island counterpart, was created when Las Vegas Boulevard (the
Strip) was widened to accommodate the construction of newer
resorts. The construction required adding a travel lane where the
then-existing public sidewalk was located. Like the Mirage, Venetian
Resorts agreed to convey a right-of-way easement to Clark County
and construct a sidewalk on the portion of the property immediately
abutting the Strip.59 Incidentally, the new Venetian sidewalk was to
be located directly across the street from the Treasure Island.60
Shortly after it was completed, a group of labor unions used the
sidewalk to hold a demonstration protesting the resort’s employment
practices.61 The Venetian responded by warning demonstrators that
they were trespassing and requesting police assistance to remove
those who would not leave. Acting on the advice of the Clark
County District Attorney, the officers refused to issue citations or
make any arrests.62 Three days later, the Venetian filed suit in the
District of Nevada seeking, among other things, a declaratory
judgment that the sidewalk was not a public forum subject to full
First Amendment protection.63 The district court reached the
opposite conclusion and the Venetian subsequently appealed.
In a 2–1 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Venetian
sidewalk was in fact a public forum. The majority focused its analysis
on the fact that the original public sidewalk, which was replaced by
the Venetian’s new walkway, was historically treated as a public

59. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937
(9th Cir. 2001).
60. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 252 (Maupin, J., concurring).
61. Venetian, 257 F.3d at 940.
62. Id. at 940–41.
63. Id. at 941.
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forum.64 It then determined that the new sidewalk, like its
predecessor, was (1) primarily intended to serve as a thoroughfare for
pedestrian traffic and (2) was “connected to and virtually
indistinguishable from the public sidewalks to its north and south.”65
Therefore, the court concluded, although the new sidewalk was
physically removed from the previous thoroughfare, it had retained
all the characteristics of a public forum subject to full First
Amendment protection.66
C. The Venetian and the Disappearing Mirage Doctrine
While the Ninth Circuit’s Venetian ruling is unquestionably
binding on Nevada’s U.S. District Court, it is also likely to be
treated as highly persuasive in Nevada’s state courts.67 Consequently,
because presumably all privately held sections of sidewalk abutting
the Strip have replaced and are connected to preexisting public
walkways, any future litigation on the issue will likely result in the
finding of a fully protected public forum. Nonetheless, one is
tempted to wonder whether Nevada Courts could still enforce the
right to exclude by concluding, like Justices Maupin, Shearing, and
Rose, that the adult-themed handbills constitute only partially
protected or wholly unprotected commercial speech.68 The answer,
however, is probably no. In S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, which is
discussed in detail below, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite view,
ruling that S.O.C./Hillsboro’s handbills constituted fully protected
expression. Thus, as it relates to handbilling on the Strip, whether a
sidewalk is privately or publicly owned is probably a distinction
without a difference. Accordingly, it appears that county
commissioners will need to formulate a new regulatory scheme if
they intend to permanently restrict obstructive canvassing.

64. Id. at 943.
65. Id. at 943–47.
66. Id. at 941–49.
67. See Hostetler v. Harris, 197 P. 697, 698 (Nev. 1921); Nash v. McNamara, 93 P.
405 (Nev. 1908). Of course, in the Mirage decision, Justice Young at least implicitly asserted
that Nevada was not bound by a federal court’s finding of a public forum. However, relying on
Mirage seems unadvisable, particularly in light of the majority’s actual position on the publicforum question. See supra Part II.A.
68. See S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 252–53 (Nev. 2001)
(Maupin, J., concurring).
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III. REGULATION BASED ON THE COMMERCIAL-SPEECH DOCTRINE
The core problem with using the commercial speech doctrine as
the sole justification for an effective canvassing regulation is that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to narrowly tailor a purely commercial
prohibition that actually reaches outcall canvassing.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a regulation of expressive
conduct will be held facially unconstitutional if it “seeks to prohibit
such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally
overbroad.”69 Of course, the Supreme Court has held that the
overbreadth doctrine does not apply when an ordinance is directed at
purely commercial expression.70 However, purely commercial
expression is defined as “speech which does no more than propose a
commercial transaction.”71 Accordingly, the commercial-speech
doctrine will save a statute from an overbreadth challenge only when
the restriction is limited to purely transactional language, providing
exceptions for distributed material containing both transactional and
fully protected speech.72 Therefore, if a purportedly “commercial”
ordinance is not so limited, it will be deemed to reach beyond
commercial speech and thus be subject to an overbreadth
challenge.73
A. The Inextricable Problem
In Las Vegas, it seems that both the canvassers and
commissioners are well aware that the Strip’s graphic handbills
represent something more than commercial speech. As S.O.C. and
Hillsboro have argued, they are not in the business of “selling

69. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.), amended by 160
F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (refusing to address an
overbreadth challenge to an ordinance regulating professional advertising for pecuniary gain);
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1982)
(holding that where an ordinance is directed at purely commercial activity the overbreadth
doctrine is not applicable).
71. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (emphasis added)
(quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1144 (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d
1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997)).
73. See id.
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hotdogs . . . providing haircuts . . . or providing any other service
that does not constitute speech.”74 Instead, they are “in the business
of providing referrals for erotic dance.”75 Accordingly, they contend,
their speech constitutes only the voluntary distribution of contact
information for adult entertainers, which is something other than a
strict commercial proposal. Thus, they conclude, their handbills
cannot be properly characterized as pure commercial speech.76 While
this conclusion is certainly subject to plausible counterargument, it
seems that Clark County Commissioners were persuaded by similar
reasoning while drafting Section 16.12.
Rather than limiting the ordinance to regulate only the
distribution of proposals for commercial transactions, commissioners
worded it to reach the distribution of materials that (1) “advertise or
promote commercial transactions,” (2) “specifically or generically
refer to products or services for sale, lease, or rent,” and (3) are
“distributed with an economic motivation of commercial gain.”77
These additional restrictions on expressive conduct seem to indicate
that commissioners recognized that a purely commercial regulation
would be insufficient to tackle the canvassing problem. To the
county’s credit, it seems plausible, even likely, that a court would
find that referrals containing contact information for erotic dancers
do not fit within the narrow scope of “proposed commercial
transactions.” In fact, a similarly strict interpretation of the
commercial speech doctrine has been applied by both the Ninth
Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Emphasizing the need to carefully determine whether a
purportedly commercial restriction actually reaches protected
expression, the court in Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City of San
Francisco stated:
The Supreme Court has recognized that drawing the line between
“purely commercial ventures and protected distribution of written
materials [is] a difficult task.” In attempting to distinguish between
commercial speech and fully-protected speech, the Court in
Schaumburg held that when a transaction “does more than inform

74.
15912).
75.
76.
77.
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private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with
providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods
and services, it [is not treated as] a variety of . . . commercial
speech.”78

Thus, because the Strip’s erotic handbills can be characterized as
providing contact information, or referrals, for dancers, they are
arguably concerned with something more than simply describing the
nature and costs of services. Therefore, they are unlikely to be
treated as purely commercial expression in the First Amendment
context. This, presumably, is why county officials drafted Section
16.12 to facially regulate more than purely commercial expression,
which is precisely why the ordinance is properly subject to an
overbreadth attack.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a commercial-based
restriction that would both resolve Clark County’s canvassing
concerns and survive an overbreadth challenge. Section 16.12
exemplifies why such regulations are unworkable. As recognized by
the Ninth Circuit, Section 16.12 expressly restricts the distribution
of material that incidentally refers to products or services for sale or
material that is freely distributed in a profit-generating scheme.79
This allows county officials to “prohibit the distribution of
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and other publications that
contain some form of commercial advertising, even if the
noncommercial content is unrelated to the advertising copy.”80
Moreover, under Section 16.12, the county may “prohibit the
distribution of a newspaper that stresses social, political, and
environmental issues if the paper’s production costs were covered by
revenue generated from advertisements,”81 or “a religious
organization’s newsletter that contain[s] advertisements for its
members’ businesses.”82 In other words, these extra-commercial
restrictions allow the county to impermissibly regulate commercial

78. 952 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 630, 632 (1980) (internal citation omitted)).
79. See County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1144.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114–15 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that distributing a free newspaper that discussed “environmental, peace, and social
justice issues” was fully protected expression even though its publication expenses were
covered, in part, by revenue derived from advertisers)).
82. Id.
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expression that is “inextricably intertwined” with a significant
amount of protected speech.83 As the Ninth Circuit noted, excessive
regulatory capabilities of this kind are highly indicative that an
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad.84 However, as explained
above, if 16.12 were not so intertwined with protected extracommercial expression, a court would likely find the handbillers’
“referrals for erotic dance” beyond the ordinance’s reach. Because
restricting the obstructive canvassing appears to require restricting
quasi-commercial expression inextricably connected to forms of
protected speech, it is unlikely that county commissioners will be
able to draft an effective, commercially-centered regulation that is
not overbroad in its reach of constitutionally-protected speech.
B. Commercial Restrictions in Content-Neutral Costumes
Restrictions on commercial speech, and particularly those that
regulate extra-commercial speech, cannot be characterized as
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Nonetheless, in
response to S.O.C./Hillsboro’s overbreadth challenge, Clark County
attempted to do just that.85 Addressing this argument, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Section 16.12 necessarily fails a contentneutral standard because, by its own terms, it is neither contentneutral nor narrowly tailored.86 Interestingly, this is presumably true
of any commercial-based regulation capable of reaching outcall
canvassers.
Government-imposed time, place, and manner restrictions on
protected speech are “valid if they (1) are content-neutral; (2) are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3)
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”87 Speech
restrictions will be deemed content-neutral only when they are
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.”88 This means that a true content-neutral ordinance must
83. Id. (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“[W]here the commercial and expressive parts of speech are ‘inextricably intertwined,’ a court
[may] not parcel out the protected and unprotected parts of the speech”)).
84. Id. at 1144.
85. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 56.
86. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1146–48.
87. One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1012
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
88. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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address only the form, and not the content, of the targeted
expression. Ordinances restricting commercial speech, however,
necessarily address content because, by definition, they expressly
regulate commercial content. Section 16.12 does not avoid this fatal
defect because, like traditional commercial restrictions, it too targets
at least some commercial content.
The advantage to defending a content-neutral restriction is that,
unlike content-based restrictions, the government need not
demonstrate that it had a “compelling interest” in restricting the
speech.89 Instead, a lower standard is imposed, requiring only that it
show a “substantial interest” in enacting the regulation.90 While
attempting to defend Section 16.12, Clark County erroneously
assumed that the court would apply the lower, content-neutral
“substantial interest” standard.91 Accordingly, it neglected to provide
“any reason why its interest in aesthetics and traffic safety [were]
compelling.”92 Nonetheless, even if the county had attempted to
frame its interests as compelling, the court almost certainly would
have disagreed. While municipalities may “have a substantial interest
in protecting the aesthetic appearance of their communities by
avoiding visual clutter[,] . . . in assuring safe and convenient
circulation on their streets,”93 and “in preventing solicitors from
harassing pedestrians on public streets and sidewalks,”94 the Supreme
Court has repeatedly refused to find such interests compelling.95
Furthermore, as explained below, even if Clark County could have
demonstrated a compelling interest, the ordinance would still have
probably failed for being insufficiently tailored.
89. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1145.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1146.
92. Id. (citing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 16.12.010 (1997) (enacting the
ordinance “[i]n recognition of the need to improve the pedestrian environment, the need to
maintain accessible sidewalks, the need to prevent harassment of pedestrians, and the need to
reduce litter”)).
93. One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1013
(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).
94. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1146 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774
(1993)).
95. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981) (plurality
opinion); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (stating that the “purpose to
keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive
it”).
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While a content-based regulation on expression will be
unconstitutional if less restrictive alternatives are available,96 the
lower content-neutral standard requires only that the regulation not
be “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
interest.”97 Section 16.12, however, fails to satisfy either tailoring
standard.98 First, the ordinance is substantially over-inclusive because
it reaches well beyond regulating those who allegedly obstruct foot
traffic and harass pedestrians. By virtue of the fact that it reaches
noncommercial speech inextricably intertwined with commercial
speech, the ordinance is over-inclusive for the same reason it was
found overbroad. Indeed, while the county asserted that its interests
were preventing harassment and alleviating sidewalk congestion,
Section 16.12 expressly regulates distributors of quasi-commercial
material, whether or not such canvassers or their materials contribute
in any way to the county’s stated concerns. 99
Additionally, and as explained by the Ninth Circuit, Section
16.12 is also over-inclusive in terms of its geographic scope, because
it fails to identify specific problematic locations.100 Instead, “it
categorically bans ‘off-premises canvassing’ along the entire Las
Vegas Resort District regardless of whether the traffic, safety, and
litter problems identified by Clark County exist at a given
location.”101
Thus, it seems that in order for Clark County to enact a
regulation based on commercial content that would pass
constitutional muster, it would have to restrict only purely
commercial expression in specifically identified locations. Such an
ordinance, however, is unlikely to resolve the county’s concerns for
at least two reasons. First, it is possible, if not likely, that the
canvassing would be found beyond the reach of such a strict
ordinance. Second, as a practical matter, even if the expression were
deemed purely commercial in nature, the canvassers could still avoid
its geographic reach by migrating to the areas of the Strip left
unidentified by the ordinance. This illustrates the fatal tailoring

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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defect that would inevitably plague such a geographically restrictive
ordinance: On the one hand, if the regulation is limited only to
problematic areas, it is necessarily under-inclusive because of the
mobile nature of the county’s concern. On the other, as the Ninth
Circuit indicated,102 if legislatures seek to avoid under-inclusion by
restricting speech at locations that are not currently problematic, the
regulation will likely be held to be over-inclusive.
Of course, the county could attempt to overcome the content
hurdle by identifying a compelling state interest in regulating extracommercial speech. However, given the nature of the county’s actual
concerns and the infrequency with which such interests are
recognized, a content-based regulation would likely result in another
expensive Ninth Circuit loss. Moreover, even if such a compelling
interest were identified, the county would still face the seemingly
insurmountable geographic tailoring problem, and it would have to
resolve it under the even stricter “least-restrictive means” standard.
Accordingly, it seems that while a purely commercial approach
cannot adequately address the county’s concern, a further-reaching,
quasi-commercial restriction is almost certain to fail under another
First Amendment challenge. Therefore, if the county is sincerely
interested in a permanent solution, it appears it would be wise to
look outside of the commercial framework.
IV. THE RIGHT TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER FOR A WORKABLE
CANVASSING REGULATION
At the conclusion of its opinion in S.O.C., Inc. v. County of
Clark, the Ninth Circuit noted that the county might solve its
canvassing problem by enacting a truly content-neutral time, place,
and manner (TPM) restriction on speech.103 In fact, the court went
so far as to tacitly endorse possible examples of workable
regulations.104 Of course, while TPM regulations have obvious
advantages in terms of defensibility, they cannot, by definition, be
used to completely eliminate the adult-themed canvassing presence
on the Strip. Therefore, in order for the county to maintain any
control over the problem, it will likely have to concede to a
canvassing presence on at least on some parts of the Strip.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1147–49.
104. Id. at 1147.
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Accordingly, the county’s presumable goal in enacting a TPM
regulation is to eliminate any and all of the harmful canvassing that
can be restricted under the First Amendment. Ultimately, and
somewhat ironically, Las Vegas must take a gamble: if it fails to
restrict enough canvassing, handbillers will continue to frustrate
tourists and resort owners, but if it restricts too much, it is sure to
face defeat in another round of First Amendment litigation.
However, and as should be expected in Las Vegas, the Strip’s
regulators can stack the odds in favor of the house.
While Clark County’s concerns about obstructive canvassing in
its resort district are relatively unique, several cities have faced similar
problems in the abortion clinic context. In Hill v. Colorado, the
Supreme Court upheld a TPM statute that successfully regulated
obstructive, aggressive leafleting practices occurring near healthcare
facilities.105 Although the Hill court addressed a regulation on
expression intended to prevent abortions, its analysis paid little
attention to the content of the speech and focused instead on the
harm resulting from the chosen method of expression.106
Interestingly, the aggressive canvassing methods employed on the
Strip are strikingly similar in both form and consequence. Thus, by
looking to the Colorado ordinance as a model for regulating the
Strip, Clark County may well be able to enact an ordinance
analogous to the one supported by the Hill Court’s ruling, while
substantially mitigating the effects of aggressive canvassing on the
Strip.
A. Hill v. Colorado
The Colorado regulation was enacted in response to concerns
about the accessibility of medical treatment at Colorado healthcare
facilities. These concerns resulted from the obstructive conduct of
anti-abortion activists known to gather at abortion clinics and
aggressively surround incoming patients while thrusting signs and
leaflets in their faces. Affected patients routinely reported that they
were offended, intimidated, and physically delayed by demonstrators.
Likewise, clinic operators testified that the aggressive protesting
significantly inconvenienced the administration of healthcare

105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
106. Id.
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services.107 Faced with threats that directly implicated public health
and safety, Colorado enacted legislation intended to balance citizens’
First Amendment rights with the state’s “imperative” interest in
providing unobstructed access to medical facilities.108 The relevant
portion of the statute provides:
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight
feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other
person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one
hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility.109

Shortly
after
enactment,
protestors
challenged
the
constitutionality of the restriction and eventually argued their case
before the Supreme Court. Writing for a six-member majority,
Justice Stevens began by discussing the statute’s actual effects on
protected expression and the propriety of using the “contentneutral” standard to determine its validity. He explained:
Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling
listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from
anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content
of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone
else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however,
make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the
form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical
facilities.110

Applying the first prong of the content-neutral test articulated in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, he explained that the statute could
not be characterized as content based, because it was “justified
without reference to the content of regulated speech.”111 He
supported this conclusion by further acknowledging that, on its face,
the regulation restricted only where certain expressive activities could
occur, and not the content of the expression itself.112

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1249–51 (Colo. 1999).
Id. at 1249 n.4 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993)).
§ 18-9-122(3) (emphasis added).
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707–08.
Id. at 719–20.
Id.
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Discussing the significance of the state’s interest, he explained
that the statutory restriction was intended to “protect those who
enter a healthcare facility from the harassment, the nuisance, the
persistent importuning, the following, the dogging, and the implied
threat of physical touching that can accompany an unwelcome
approach . . . by a person wishing to . . . thrust an undesired handbill
upon her.”113 Thus, he noted, Colorado intended to protect the
“right of ‘passage without obstruction,’” which had been implicated
by violations of the “right . . . to be let alone.”114 Of course,
however, the “right to be let alone” is in obvious tension with the
expressive rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
While the right to persuade others is not curtailed simply because
a listener finds a particular message offensive, the First Amendment’s
protections do not always reach offensive speech that is so intrusive
that it cannot be avoided by the unwilling listener.115 Instead, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that “no one has a right to
press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”116 Even in the
public forum, Cohen’s freedom to wear his vulgar jacket extends
only insofar as his audience can “avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities.”117 Accordingly, and specific to Colorado’s concern,
“[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical
facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests.”118
The unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding offensive speech
stems from the broader “right to be let alone,” which Justice
Brandeis described as the “the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”119 Of course, “[t]his commonlaw ‘right’ is more accurately characterized as an ‘interest’ that States
can choose to protect in certain situations.” 120 And while this

113. Id. at 724.
114. Id. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
115. Id. at 716 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988)).
116. Id. at 718 (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738).
117. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the right to engage in offensive expression as long as those offended by it can avoid
it).
118. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772–73 (1994).
119. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716–17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 717 n.24 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967)).
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interest has special force in the privacy of the home, it may also be
protected where citizens are in transit.121 This is because of its
contextual relationship with the right of passage without
obstruction, which guarantees “as free a passage without obstruction
as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the
same privilege.”122 Thus, the critical question is, at what point does a
demonstrator’s persistence violate the rights of the passerby he
intends to persuade? According to the Hill majority, it is when the
speaker continues to importune, follow, intimidate, or otherwise
obstruct, after his offered communication has been declined.123 Thus,
because the Colorado statute regulated only speech that interfered
with the protection of these rights, the Court found that the
restriction was the product of a significant state interest.124
Discussing the statute’s tailoring, Justice Stevens began by
reiterating that “when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely
foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring
requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”125 He then
demonstrated that the statute neither entirely foreclosed on a
particular means of expression nor burdened an excessive amount of
speech. Starting with the regulation on the display of signs or
placards, he noted that the required eight-foot separation between
the speaker and audience was unlikely to have an adverse effect on
the demonstrator’s ability to communicate.126 Moreover, he noted,
the restriction “might actually aid the pedestrians’ ability to see the
signs by preventing others from surrounding them and impeding
their view.”127
With regard to oral statements, he continued, the distance
requirement does impose a burden on the speaker’s ability to be
heard, especially where there is background noise or the speaker is
competing for attention.128 Nonetheless, it is evident that the statute

121. Id. at 717.
122. Id. (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
204 (1921)).
123. Id. at 718.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 726 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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is tailored to keep speakers at a distance rather than to quiet their
message, because it does not limit the speaker’s ability to
communicate by restricting noise level or the use of amplification
equipment, even though similar restrictions have been previously
upheld. 129 More importantly, the eight-foot restriction allows the
speaker to communicate at a “normal conversational distance” unlike
the defective fifteen-foot zone rejected in Schenck.130 Furthermore,
the statute does not require the speaker to relocate when an
unwilling listener passes within eight-feet of the expression, and it
imposes a “knowing” requirement to protect speakers who
mistakenly believe they are maintaining the mandated distance.131
Consistent with Colorado’s concern, handbilling is the form of
expression most burdened by the statute. Indeed, it is arguable that
the eight-foot restriction significantly limits the ability to force
literature on unwilling pedestrians. However, it does not prevent the
handbiller from “simply standing near the path of oncoming
pedestrians and proffering his or her material, which the pedestrians
can easily accept.”132 Accordingly, the statute primarily burdens the
speaker’s ability to reach the unwilling listener, and any burden on
the opportunity to reach the willing recipients is de minimis at best.
Thus, even the handbilling restriction is consistent with the First
Amendment, which guarantees the citizen’s right to “reach the
minds of willing listeners,” by providing an “opportunity to win
their attention.”133
Addressing the statute’s geographic tailoring, Justice Stevens
reasoned that because the restriction applies only within one
hundred feet of healthcare facilities—where citizens are often in
particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions—the state
had narrowly limited the restriction to the physical areas where
obstruction and unwelcomed speech posed the greatest concern.
From this perspective, the Colorado restriction interferes with less
speech than other health and safety related speech regulations that
have previously been upheld, including the restriction of all
fairground handbilling to a limited number of booths upheld in

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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Heffron, and other commonplace ordinances requiring silence near
hospitals.134 Thus, in light of Colorado’s strong interest in regulation
and the minimal burdens imposed on expression, it should come as
little surprise that the court upheld the statute.
B. The Colorado Cure for Clark County Canvassing
A Clark County ordinance closely resembling Colorado’s eightfoot rule would likely reach enough obstructive canvassing to
significantly curb its concerning effects and survive a First
Amendment challenge. Of course, to achieve success on the Strip,
commissioners would have to alter certain provisions to some
degree. Such modifications, however, need not make the statute
more restrictive than the Colorado version. For example, in order to
adequately address the Strip’s narrow sidewalks, the first portion of
the ordinance could be reworked to provide:
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight
feet of such person, or where space restrictions do not permit safely
maintaining such a separation, then a distance not less than safety
will permit, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to. . . .

Strictly speaking, a statute providing this exception to the default
eight-foot requirement would actually impose less of a burden on
handbillers than the Colorado statute, because where applicable, it
would allow them to get closer to their intended audience. However,
at first glance, it also seems that such an exception would dilute the
effectiveness of the ordinance. After all, assuming that the “safest
possible distance” is on the edges of the sidewalk, then wherever the
exception applies, canvassers are free to remain within an arm’s
length of passersby.
Nonetheless, such a statute would dramatically improve the
status quo on the Strip in at least two ways. First, it would give
commissioners and property owners an incentive to limit the
applicability of the exception. This could be done by creating special
canvassing “safe” zones carved out of public and private property
abutting the problematic sections of sidewalk within the statute’s
reach. In these areas, canvassers would be forced to maintain a

134. Hill, 530 U.S. at 727–28. (citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
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greater distance—if not the full eight feet—from pedestrians, unless a
pedestrian publicly consented to an approach. This physical
separation alone would alleviate much of the congestion in popular
canvassing areas, and it could be created at any location within the
statute’s reach. Thus, after determining the statute’s geographic
scope, the county could, with the cooperation of property owners,
force a physical gap between canvassers and pedestrians on an as
needed basis. This sort of adaptability would allow the county to
keep pace with peripatetic canvassers.
Second, even in areas where the exception applies, the proposed
consent requirement would likely result in a significant decrease in
the number of canvassers. The canvassing model used by outcall
services requires distributing “the maximum number of
advertisements at the least cost.”135 When canvassers are free to
approach and distribute material to all pedestrians, there is an
incentive to employ enough canvassers to reach each passerby.
However, when the pool of possible recipients is reduced to those
who affirmatively consent to a canvasser’s approach, the need for
canvassers presumably decreases proportionately. Indeed, even under
the charitable assumption that one-third of the Strip’s visitors would
publicly consent to distribution and that it would take one-third of
the current canvassing force to elicit that consent, the restriction
would still effectively reduce the need for canvassers by a two-thirds.
Certainly, this would eventually result in a corresponding reduction
in the number of canvassers.
Furthermore, the consent requirement may cause the canvassing
model to fail altogether. If canvassers are limited to those who
publicly consent to an approach, then they are likely to forfeit two
substantial groups of potential clients: (1) those who would prefer to
pursue adult entertainment without drawing attention to themselves;
and (2) those who are not interested in the service until they receive
the provocative handbill. Without the ability to reach these groups,
aggressive canvassing could very well become an obsolete method of
marketing adult services, and this, it seems, is exactly the sort of
result Clark County intends to achieve.

135. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 9.
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C. The Defensibility of a Clark County Version

Of course, with the likelihood of imposing such a burden on
canvassing comes the likelihood of another First Amendment
challenge. Moreover, while the county has an apparent advantage by
virtue of the Hill ruling, a successful defense will still require a
showing that the circumstances prompting the restriction are
analogous to those at issue in Colorado. To create this analogy, the
county will have to demonstrate a comparable interest in restricting
aggressive canvassing and similarly tailor the geographic reach of the
regulation. Additionally, the county will also want to consider and
preempt possible First Amendment challenges by including
additional temporal limitations in its version.
Clark County’s biggest risk in relying on Hill is that a court
could be persuaded that the troubling situation on the Strip is not as
significant as the situation faced by the Colorado legislature.
However, a plausible argument could be made that, at bottom, Clark
County and Colorado are seeking to protect almost identical
interests. In order to frame such an argument, the County will want
to clearly identify the restriction as a legislative balancing of its
interest in protecting pedestrians’ right to proceed without
obstruction and the speaker’s right to reach a willing audience.
1. The State’s interest in a reasonable restriction
Of course, canvassers will likely contend that the right to proceed
without obstruction is not implicated to the same degree that it was
in Hill. Presumably, they will attempt to distinguish themselves from
abortion protestors by arguing that their expressive tactics do not
infringe on the “right to be let alone.” To do so, they will likely
assert that, unlike abortion protestors, individual canvassers rarely, if
ever, importune, follow, intimidate, or physically obstruct, after an
offered handbill has been declined.136 While there may be some truth
to this distinction, it does not allow canvassers to escape the fact that
the net effect of their operation is the obstruction of pedestrians on
Las Vegas Boulevard. Indeed, while the conduct of individual
canvassers may not rise to the level of importuning or physically
obstructing unwilling listeners, the same cannot be said of the tactics
intentionally employed by a canvassing company taken as a whole. As
136. See id.
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pedestrians attempt to proceed along the Strip, they are frequently
delayed by groups of canvassers offering handbills. When an offer
from a canvasser is refused, a co-canvasser approaches and makes an
identical offer; when that offer is rejected, the process repeats.137
Surely, this orchestrated effort to generate a profit by importuning
and obstructing pedestrians is no less repugnant to Brandeis’ beloved
“right to be let alone” than the similar conduct of individual rightto-life demonstrators. In fact, it may well be that this sophisticated
attempt to force provocative quasi-commercial speech on an
unwilling listener is even more offensive than the aggressive delivery
of sociopolitical expression. From this perspective, Clark County’s
interest in protecting pedestrians from obstruction caused by
unwanted speech appears to be similar in significance to the interest
that persuaded the Court in Hill.
Responding to this argument, canvassers might contend that a
pedestrian’s refusal of a handbill is distinguishable from the
“unwillingness” of the protected audience in Colorado because the
canvasser’s handbill is less likely to elicit a confrontational, emotional
response. Essentially, this argument would presuppose that the
handbilling on the Strip is not as inherently offensive as the emotive
language and gruesome images that often accompany anti-abortion
demonstrations. Thus, it implicitly suggests that because pedestrians
are less likely to be offended by nearly pornographic handbills, their
refusal is somehow less indicative of their unwillingness. Whatever
merit this claim might have, it applies only when a pedestrian refuses
a handbill without recognizing its content, because once content is
purposely refused, the recipient’s unwillingness is unquestionable. Of
course, as a practical matter, it seems that it would be rare for a
pedestrian to be entirely ignorant of the content of the refused
handbill—particularly when surrounded by groups of canvassers clad
in shirts reading “Girls Direct To You In 20 Minutes.”138 However,
even assuming that this ignorance is common, the degree to which
the content is offensive is unlikely to affect the court’s analysis,
because, as the Hill court explained, “[i]t may not be the content of
137. Schoenmann, supra note 2.
138. See Steve Marcus, Men Hand Out Cards Advertising Out-Call “Entertainers” on the
Strip on Sunday, July 24, 2011 (photograph), in Joe Schoenmann, Casino Execs, County Staff,
Recommend 7 Steps to Clean Up Strip, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 29, 2012, 2:00 AM),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/29/group-suggests-ways-strip-can-clean-itsact/; see also Wyland, supra note 23.
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the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault,’ that
justifies proscription.”139
Furthermore, even if challengers convince the court that the
difference in content is somehow relevant, it remains problematic to
use likelihood of offense to establish pedestrian unwillingness.
Although it may be true that people are generally uncomfortable
when forced to view images of aborted fetuses, the same may be true
of people forced to view images of objectified young women
juxtaposed with language suggestive of prostitution.140 In fact, it
stands to reason that those likely to be seriously offended by
gruesome abortion imagery—including those who stringently
oppose abortion on moral grounds and those who strongly support
women’s freedoms—are also those most likely to be offended by
material depicting young ladies as purchasable goods. That this
reaction is likely to occur on both ends of the political spectrum is
indicative of at least one reason that a court would reject using the
probability of offense to determine whether a pedestrian was truly
unwilling to receive a rejected handbill. Such a subjective standard
would require the court to assume that pedestrians generally prefer
certain images to others. While courts typically refuse to make such
value judgments, in this case, where the probability of offense is so
unpredictable, judges are likely to be particularly repulsed.
2. Reasonable tailoring
Because challengers are unlikely to find a relevant way to
meaningfully distinguish obstructive canvassing from obstructive
protesting, county officials should anticipate an attack on the
restriction’s tailoring. Fortunately, an effective version of the statute
upheld in Hill need not burden any additional types of speech. In
fact, because commissioners can achieve the desired goal while
omitting certain provisions of the Colorado ordinance, they will
want to do so in order to be sure that no unnecessary speech is
burdened. For example, to avoid an over-inclusive challenge, the
county will need to consider excising the restriction on “oral

139. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11
n.6 (1975)).
140. Peter O’Connell, Handbills Battle Hits Strip, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (June
11, 1999), http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/1999/Jun-11-Fri-1999/news/1135
3806.html.
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protest,”141 because although the Hill court found the provision to
be reasonably tailored to Colorado’s interest, the county’s interest
probably does not require such a limitation.
a. Geographic tailoring. In addition to tailoring the types of
speech it will regulate, Commissioners will also need to carefully and
explicitly define the exact locations where the new ordinance will
apply. Fortunately, the Colorado statute also provides an adaptable
example of reasonable geographic tailoring. As a starting point, it is
important to note that the restriction at issue in Hill did not apply
only to clinics performing abortion services; instead, it extended to
all healthcare facilities.142 This distinction is noteworthy because it
suggests that the court is unlikely to require similar statutes to be
applicable only where obstruction has previously occurred. Indeed,
Hill seems to indicate that such restrictions are reasonably tailored
when imposed within one hundred feet of any location where the
legitimate interest is implicated.143 Concurring with the Hill
Judgment, Justice Souter, joined by Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, explained that while the Colorado statute “was not
enacted to protect dental patients, [he] [could not] say it [was]
beyond the State’s interest to do so; someone facing an hour with a
drill in his tooth may reasonably be protected from the intrusive
behavior of strangers who are otherwise free to speak.”144 This
suggests that as long as the ordinance’s geographic reach is clearly
defined and limited only to areas where the concern for obstruction
is reasonably implicated, courts will be somewhat deferential to the
county’s tailoring.
While challengers may attempt to distinguish resort visitors as
less vulnerable than those seeking medical attention, it stands to
reason that the Strip’s pedestrians are at least as susceptible to harm
as those protected by the Colorado statute. Whereas medical patients
risk missing an opportunity for treatment, agitating an existing
condition, or psychological harm, canvassers have caused members of
their unwilling audience, who are often unfamiliar with their

141.
142.
143.
144.
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surroundings, to risk life and limb in a dangerous street to avoid the
unwanted expression.145
Accordingly, it seems that the county has at least two workable
options for restricting the geographic reach of a Hill-based
ordinance. First, acting cautiously, it could limit the restriction to
reach only carefully defined areas where canvassing has historically
been obstructive and locations where pedestrians are likely to be
endangered by obstructive conduct. This sort of tailoring would be
analogous to further narrowing the reach of the Colorado statute,
which currently applies within one hundred feet of all healthcare
facilities, to apply only at facilities where abortions or other
controversial medical procedures are likely to occur. Moreover, such
a limited restriction is consistent with the county’s interest because it
allows for the identification and subsequent regulation of any
specified area where unrestricted canvassing is likely to unduly
obstruct pedestrians. This, in theory, would allow for the regulation
of all heavily traveled sections of the Strip’s narrow sidewalks. Thus,
taking a cautious approach, the county could adopt an ordinance
that by analogy is less restrictive than the statute upheld in Hill while
still restricting enough canvassing to vindicate its interests.
Accordingly, under Hill, it appears unlikely that such a geographic
reach could be found unreasonably over- or under-inclusive.
Second, relying on Justice Souter’s description of Colorado’s
tailoring, the county could possibly take a more aggressive approach
by applying its restriction to any location where unregulated
handbilling could endanger pedestrians. After all, while it seems that
even the most ardent opponents of dental hygiene are unlikely to
obstruct dental patients, the Hill majority found it reasonable for
Colorado to regulate such conduct because dental patients could be
particularly vulnerable to its effect.146 Of course, Clark County would
be unwise to interpret this language to support an ordinance
reaching all sidewalks abutting busy county streets, because although
obstructive canvassing on any such sidewalk could present dangers
similar to those on the strip, most courts would be loath to uphold a
restriction so geographically expansive. However, commissioners
might be able to impose the ordinance where avoiding unwanted

145. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 18 n.17; Schoenmann, supra
note 2; Morrison, supra note 25.
146. Hill, 530 U.S. at 739 (Souter, J., concurring).
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speech could reasonably endanger pedestrians, or, in other words, in
areas where both canvassing and dangerous traffic would be
reasonably expected. While any increase in restrictive reach increases
litigation risks, Hill appears to support a geographic scope at least
this broad. Moreover, looser tailoring would allow the county to
regulate off-Strip areas posing similar dangers to tourists, including
the sections of sidewalk surrounding historic downtown Las Vegas,
where former Mayor Oscar Goodman has repeatedly attempted to
regulate outcall canvassing.147
b. Temporal tailoring. In addition to geographic tailoring, county
officials might also consider adding a final layer of litigation
protection by limiting the ordinance to apply only at certain times of
the day. Although Hill suggests that the county would likely satisfy
the First Amendment’s tailoring requirements by carefully limiting
both the types of expression restricted and the locations where such
restrictions apply, a time restriction would only further indicate Clark
County’s commitment to protecting speech rights. Furthermore, a
timing restriction need not diminish the ordinance’s ability to reach
problematic canvassing, because while Las Vegas is the prototypical
twenty-four hour town, there are certainly times when canvassing
ebbs. For example, while visitors are known to walk to the Strip until
the early morning hours, comparatively few continue into the early
daylight hours. During these few hours, the incentive to canvass
decreases along with the pedestrian population. Thus, by analyzing
traffic patterns and canvassing habits, the county may well be able to
identify specific periods when regulation is wholly unnecessary and
draft its ordinance accordingly. Therefore, because a temporal
limitation appears to be a low-cost means of garnering a court’s
favor, county commissioners would be wise to consider including
one in future attempts to regulate obstructive canvassing.
V. CONCLUSION
With troubling economic conditions already handicapping the
resort industry, protecting visitors from unwanted, obstructive, and
otherwise dangerous canvassing has once again become a priority for
Clark County’s legislature. Moreover, without new regulation, the

147. Toplikar, supra note 2.
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county actually risks a significant increase in the canvassing presence,
because the odds favor canvassers in a challenge to their current
exclusion from privately-owned sidewalks. However, while attempts
to entirely eradicate canvassing through the commercial speech
doctrine will likely result in costly defeat, the county does have
powerful and defensible legislative options. A properly modified
version of the statute upheld in Hill is not only capable of
significantly mitigating canvassing concerns, it is also likely to survive
a First Amendment challenge. And although this author lacks the
resources necessary to define the precise scope of such legislation,
county commissioners, using this Comment as a rough guide, will
likely be able to draft an effective and defensible ordinance restricting
off-premise canvassing on the Las Vegas Strip.
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